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Abstract
In a key predistribution scheme a trusted authority distributes pieces of information among a
set of users in such a way that users belonging to a speci/ed privileged subset can compute
individually a secret key common to this subset. In such a scheme, a family of forbidden subsets
of users cannot obtain any information about the value of the secret. In this paper, we present a
new construction of a key predistribution scheme using a family of vector space secret sharing
schemes. The set of privileged users and the family of forbidden subsets is described in terms of
the family of vector space access structures. A generalization using linear secret sharing schemes
is given. We show that a particular case of this construction is any key predistribution scheme
in which pieces of information and secrets are linear combinations of random numbers. Using
this result, we show explicitly that the most important key predistribution schemes can be seen
as a particular case of this construction. For this construction, the question of when given secrets
can be predistributed is discussed.
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1. Introduction
One major problem in communication and network security is key distribution. Most
networks can be thought of as broadcast networks, in which anyone connected to
the network will have access to all the information that =ows through it. In many
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situations, such as a pay-per-view television broadcast, the data should be available to
some privileged users. In this case, encryption is frequently used in order to protect
the con/dentiality of information. If AES [12] or any other private-key cryptosystem is
employed to ensure con/dentiality, then it is necessary to distribute keys to the users
in a secure fashion.
In a key predistribution scheme a trusted authority generates and distributes secret
pieces of information that allow some privileged users to recover a private key. Users
belonging to a speci/ed privileged subset can compute individually a secret key com-
mon to this subset. A family of forbidden subsets of users must have no information
about the value of the secret. We will consider key predistribution schemes which are
unconditionally secure; i.e., where security does not depend on any computational as-
sumption. Key predistribution schemes are used in broadcast encryption. A broadcast
encryption is a key predistribution followed by a broadcast message which is to be
decrypted by a speci/ed privileged subset of users. The decrypted message may be a
session key for use in a private-key cryptosystem by the privileged users.
Various key predistribution schemes have so far been proposed. Blom’s scheme
[2] implements a key predistribution scheme in which any 2-subset of users has an
associated secret key and forbidden subsets are subsets with at most a /xed number of
users disjoint with the privileged subset. Blundo’s et al. scheme [4] is a generalization
of Blom’s scheme in which any t-subset is a privileged subset. Fiat–Naor’s scheme [7]
implements a key predistribution scheme for any subset of users as privileged subsets
and the family of forbidden subsets of the Blom’s scheme.
In this paper, we present a new construction of a key predistribution scheme using
a family of vector space secret sharing schemes. An introduction to secret sharing
schemes and key predistribution schemes can be found in Section 2. In Section 3 of this
paper, we present the new construction of key predistribution schemes. We determine
the collection of privileged subsets of users and its forbidden subsets by means of the
secret sharing schemes used. The family of privileged subsets is described in terms
of the family of the access structures of the vector space secret sharing schemes used
to construct the key predistribution scheme. The collection of forbidden subsets is
expressed in terms of the dual of the family of vector space access structures. We
determine the information rate and the total information rate of the proposed scheme.
We show a particular case of this construction that gives us a key predistribution
scheme for any collection of privileged subsets together with its family of forbidden
subsets. In Section 4 we present some extensions of this construction by means of
linear secret sharing schemes instead of vector space secret sharing schemes. We show
that a particular case of this construction is any key predistribution scheme in which
pieces of information and secrets are linear combinations of random numbers. Using
the above results with this extension of the construction, we /nd a method to compute
the subsets of privileged users and families of forbidden subsets. This method is valid
for any key predistribution scheme in which secrets and pieces of secrets are linear
combinations of random numbers. We show, explicitly, that the most important key
predistribution schemes can be seen as a particular case of this construction. We discuss
when given secrets can be predistributed. At the end of the paper, we present the fact
that all the results of the paper hold when is used a multisecret sharing scheme instead
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of vector space secret sharing schemes or linear secret sharing schemes. We end with
some conclusions in Section 5.
2. Denitions and some previews
First we present an introduction to secret sharing schemes and practical implemen-
tations. This tool will be used on the presented constructions of key predistribution
schemes. A secret sharing scheme is a method for dividing a secret into pieces called
shares. Shares are distributed among a set P of participants in such a way that only
authorized subsets of P can reconstruct the secret from their shares. We will consider
perfect secret sharing schemes, that is, secret sharing schemes in which subsets that
are not authorized to reconstruct the secret have absolutely no information on it. Secret
sharing schemes are unconditionally secure; that is, security does not depend on the
computational resources of an adversary. Sometimes it is useful to consider a special
participant D ∈ P called dealer. See [14,15] for a comprehensive introduction to secret
sharing schemes.
The access structure,  ⊂ 2P , of a secret sharing scheme is the family of authorized
subsets. Access structures are considered to be monotone increasing, i.e., any superset
of an authorized subset must be authorized. Then, the access structure  is determined
by the family of minimal authorized subsets, 0, which is called the basis of ,
because = {A ⊂ P: there exists B∈0 such that B ⊂ A}. We will say that  is the
closure of 0 and we will write  = cl(0).
For example, the (t; n)-threshold access structure consists of all the subsets with at
least t of n participants, where t; n¿ 0. Secret sharing schemes for threshold access
structures were the /rst secret sharing schemes proposed and have been independently
introduced by Blakley [1] and Shamir [13] in 1979. In this latter work, Shamir intro-
duced a secret sharing scheme for a threshold access structure based on polynomial
interpolation.
For the special case of an (n; n)-threshold access structure, Karnin et al. de/ne in
[10] a secret sharing scheme in the following way: for a secret k in a /nite /eld
GF(q), with q a power of a prime, the dealer takes at random spi ∈GF(q) for any
i = 1; : : : ; n − 1 and P = {p1; : : : ; pn}. The share of participant pi ∈P is spi for any
i=1; : : : ; n−1 and spn =k− (sp1 + · · ·+ spn−1 ). In this secret sharing scheme, the secret
can only be reconstructed with all the shares, using k =
∑n
i=1 spi .
The vector space construction is a useful method for constructing schemes for certain
access structures, and was introduced by Brickell [5].  is said to be a vector space
access structure if, for some vector space GF(q)t over a /nite /eld GF(q), there exists
a function
 :P ∪ {D} → GF(q)t
such that A∈ if and only if the vector  (D) can be expressed as a linear combination
of the vectors in the set  (A)={ (p): p∈A}. If  is a vector space access structure,
we can construct a secret sharing scheme for  with set of secrets GF(q) (see [5]
for proofs). For a secret value k ∈GF(q), the dealer takes at random an element
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v∈GF(q)t , such that k = v ·  (D). The share of a participant p∈P is sp = v  (p).
A scheme constructed in this way is called a vector space secret sharing scheme.
Shamir’s scheme [13] can be seen as a vector space secret sharing scheme [14]. The
Karnin et al., secret sharing scheme [10] can be seen as a vector space secret sharing
scheme using t = n,  (pi) = ei with e1; : : : ; en the canonical basis of GF(q)n and
 (D) = e1 + · · ·+ en.
The linear secret sharing scheme is a generalization of the vector space secret sharing
scheme construction that provides a secret sharing scheme for any access structure [8].
This construction is a modi/cation of the vector space secret sharing scheme in which
every participant can have more than one vector.
A monotone decreasing family of subsets F ⊂ P is a family in which any sub-
set of an element of the family must be an element of the family. The family of
non-authorized subsets is an example of a monotone decreasing family of subsets. In
general a monotone decreasing family of subsets is determined by the family F0 of
maximal subsets, because F = {A ⊂ P: there exists B∈F0 such that A ⊂ B}. We
will say that F is the coclosure of F0 and we will write F= cocl(F0).
Using the family of non-authorized subsets, Jackson and Martin de/ne in [8] the dual
access structure of  as ∗ = {P − A: A ∈ }. Some nice properties and applications
of the dual structure were presented in [8].
In a key predistribution scheme a trusted authority generates and distributes secret
pieces of information to users on U = {1; 2; : : : ; n} in such a way that users called
privileged can individually compute a secret key ki with i = 1; : : : ; ‘. Every secret ki
determines a subset of privileged users Pi ⊂ U. We will denote by Fi ⊂ 2U the col-
lection of forbidden subsets to key ki, i.e., the collection of all possible coalitions of
users against which the secret key ki is to remain secure. The main diNerence between
secret sharing schemes and key predistribution schemes is that in the /rst schemes
there is only one secret and the recovering is performed by a subset of participants
and in the second schemes there are more than one secret and the recovering is per-
formed individually. As in secret sharing scenario the security in a key predistribution
scheme is unconditional. Of course Fi must be a monotone decreasing access structure
verifying that for any F ∈Fi, F ∩ Pi = ∅. We will call a key predistribution scheme
unconditionally secure for privileged subsets Pi and forbidden subsets Fi, i=1; : : : ; ‘,
simply a (Pi;Fi)i-key predistribution scheme.
The /rst author to consider key predistribution schemes was Blom in [2]. In this
paper the Blom’s scheme [2] was presented, which implements a (P;FP)P-key predis-
tribution scheme with P any 2-subset of U and FP={F ⊂ U: P∩F=∅ and |F |6!},
for !¿ 1. For this scheme the trusted authority constructs a random polynomial
f(x; y) =
!∑
i=0
!∑
j=0
sijxiyj
with sij = sji ∈GF(q). For every user i∈U the trusted authority chooses at random
ai ∈GF(q). These n numbers are distinct and public. The trusted authority gives to
user i coeOcients of polynomial gi(x)=f(x; ai) as his/her secret pieces of information.
The key associated with the pair of user Pij = {i; j} is kij = gi(aj) = gj(ai).
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Some other constructions have also been given. The trivial scheme implements a
(P;FP)P-key predistribution scheme with P any t-subset of U, with t¿ 1, and FP =
{F ⊂ U: P ∩ F = ∅}. In this scheme the trusted authority chooses a random value
kP ∈GF(q) and gives kP to every user of P.
In the Matsumoto–Imai’s scheme [11] the trusted authority chooses at random (m;m)
symmetric matrices A1; : : : ; Ah over GF(q) and assigns identity vectors Ii ∈GF(q)m to
every user i∈U. The matrices are private and the identity vectors are public and
distinct for every user. The trusted authority gives to user i vectors A1ITi ; : : : ; AhI
T
i
as his/her secret pieces of information. The key associated with the pair of user
Pij = {i; j} is the vector kij = (IjA1ITi ; : : : ; IjAhITi ). This key predistribution scheme
implements a (P;FP)P-key predistribution scheme with P any 2-subset of U and
FP depending on the collection of identity vectors chosen by the trusted
authority.
The Blundo et al. scheme [4] implements a (P;FP)P-key predistribution scheme with
P any t-subset of U and FP = {F ⊂ U: P ∩ F = ∅ and |F |6!}, with t¿ 2; !¿ 1.
The trusted authority uses a symmetric polynomial in t variables in a similar way to
Blom’s scheme.
The Fiat–Naor’s scheme [7] implements a (P;FP)P-key predistribution scheme for
any P ⊂ U and FP ={F ⊂ U: P∩F =∅ and |F |6!}, with !¿ 1. For every subset
F ⊂ U of cardinality at most !, the trusted authority generates at random sF ∈GF(q)
and gives sF to every user in U − F . The key associated with a privileged set P is
kP =
∑
F∈FP sF .
We are interested in the eOciency of a key predistribution scheme, as measured
by the amount of secret information that is distributed to each user. Let Ui denote
the set of all possible secret pieces of information that might be distributed to user
i∈U. Let UU ⊂ U1 × · · · × Un denote the set of all possible combinations of secret
pieces received by users in U. We will assume that each secret key ki is equally
likely to be any element of GF(q). We will also assume that there is a probability
distribution on UU, and that the trusted authority chooses uU ∈UU according to this
probability distribution. In terms of the entropy function (see [6] for more details on
the entropy function), the information rate of a key predistribution scheme is de/ned
to be
%=min
i∈U
log q
H (Ui)
:
In order to measure the total amount of information distributed to all the users, the
total information rate of a key predistribution scheme is de/ned to be
%T =
log q
H (UU)
:
For more information on key predistribution schemes see [3,16].
In the next section, we are going to present a generation of key predistribution
schemes using secret sharing schemes.
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Table 1
x  (x)
G1 (1; 0; 0) sG1 = r1
G2 (1; 0; 0) sG2 = r1
G3 (0; 1; 0) sG3 = r2
G4 (1; 0; 1) sG4 = r1 + r3
D1 (0; 0; 1) k1 = r3
D2 (1; 1; 1) k2 = r1 + r2 + r3
D3 (1; 2; 3) k3 = r1 + 2r2 + 3r3
3. A key predistribution scheme using vector space secret sharing schemes
We de/ne a key predistribution scheme by means of a family of vector space secret
sharing schemes. The idea of the key predistribution scheme is the following. Let us
consider a family of vector space secret sharing schemes with the same shares for
diNerent secrets. This can be obtained by considering several dealers with diNerent
linear combinations. Suppose that every participant is a subset of users. The trusted
authority distributes the set of secrets giving the common share of one participant (for
all the schemes) to the users belonging to this participant. Informally, we can say that
instead of distributing shares to users, the dealer distributes shares to (possibly inter-
secting) subsets, each share being given to all the users belonging to the corresponding
subset.
Let U = {1; 2; : : : ; n} a set of n users and a family of subsets G ⊂ 2U. Let  :G ∪
{D1; : : : ; D‘} → GF(q)t be a map with D1; : : : ; D‘ ∈ G. For any i = 1; : : : ; ‘ the map
 i =  |G∪{Di} de/nes a vector space access structure i = {A ⊂ G:  i(Di)∈ 〈 i(A)〉}
on the set of participants G.
The de/nition of the key predistribution scheme is as follows. For a random vector
v∈GF(q)t we distribute secrets ki=v  i(Di) for any i=1; : : : ; ‘. The share sG=v  i(G)
of participant G ∈G is the same for all the schemes and it is distributed to users in G.
Let us present an example of this construction. Suppose that U = {1; 2; 3; 4; 5} and
G={G1; G2; G3; G4} with G1={1; 3}; G2={2; 4}; G3={1; 2; 5}; G4={1; 2; 4; 5}. Consider
 :G ∪ {D1; D2; D3} → GF(q)3, with q¿ 3, the map de/ned in Table 1 with the
determined share sGi and secret keys ki when the random vector (r1; r2; r3) is used.
Then user 1 receives r1; r2; r1 + r3, user 2 receives r1; r2; r1 + r3, user 3 receives r1,
user 4 receives r1; r1 + r3 and user 5 receives r2; r1 + r3.
The following proposition give us the family of privileged subsets of users for every
secret key:
Proposition 1. The above construction is a key predistribution scheme in the set of
users U with privileged subsets:
Pi =
⋃
A∈i
( ⋂
G∈A
G
)
for every secret ki with i = 1; : : : ; ‘.
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Proof. For a given i = 1; : : : ; ‘ we wish to know what users u∈U can individually
recover the secret ki. Due to the construction of the scheme, {G ∈G: u∈G} must be
an authorized subset of i. Then, there exists A∈i such that u∈G for any G ∈A,
that is u∈⋂G∈A G. So, u∈⋃A∈i(⋂G∈A G).
The family of forbidden subsets is the following:
Proposition 2. For the privileged subset Pi of this key predistribution scheme, the
family of forbidden subsets is
Fi = cocl
({
U−
⋃
G∈A
G: A∈∗i
})
:
Proof. A subset of users F ⊂ U cannot obtain any information about the value of the
secret ki if {G ∈G: there exists u∈F such that u∈G} ∈ i. By de/nition of the dual
structure, {G ∈G: for any u∈F; u∈U−G}∈∗i , that is, {G ∈G: F ⊂ U−G}∈∗i .
If F veri/es that A={G ∈G: F ⊂ U−G}∈∗i then F ⊂
⋂
G∈A(U−G)=U−
⋃
G∈A G
for some A∈∗i . Conversely if F ⊂ U −
⋃
G∈A G =
⋂
G∈A(U − G) for some A∈∗i
then A ⊂ {G ∈G: F ⊂ U− G}∈∗i because A∈∗i .
In these two propositions it suOces to use minimal subsets of i and ∗i , respectively.
In the example above, we can compute the access structure 1 = cl({{G1; G4};
{G2; G4}}), its dual ∗1 = cl({{G1; G2}; {G4}}), the determined subset of privileged
users P1 = (G1 ∩ G4) ∪ (G2 ∩ G4) = {1; 2; 4} and the family of forbidden subsets
of users F1 = cocl({U − G1 ∪ G2;U − G4}) = cocl({{5}; {3}}) = {{3}; {5}; ∅}. We
also have 2 = cl({{G3; G4}}), its dual ∗2 = cl({{G3}; {G4}}), the determined subset
of privileged users P2 = G3 ∩ G4 = {1; 2; 5} and the family of forbidden subsets of
users F2=cocl({U−G3;U−G4})=cocl({{3; 4}; {3}})={{3; 4}; {3}; {4}; ∅}. Finally
3 = cl({{G1; G3; G4}; {G2; G3; G4}}), its dual ∗3 = cl({{G1; G2}; {G3}; {G4}}), the
determined subset of privileged users P2 = (G1 ∩ G3 ∩ G4) ∪ (G2 ∩ G3 ∩ G4) = {1; 2}
and the family of forbidden subsets of users F3 = cocl({U − G1 ∪ G2;U − G3;U −
G4}) = cocl({{5}; {3; 4}; {3}}) = {{3; 4}; {3}; {4}; {5}; ∅}.
An easy computation give us the values of the information rate and the total infor-
mation rate for this key predistribution scheme:
Proposition 3. This key predistribution scheme has information rate
%=
1
maxi∈U |{G ∈G: i∈G}|
and total information rate
%T =
1
|G| :
For instance, if we use a graph with vertex set U and edge set G (that is |G| = 2
for any G ∈G), we have %=1=d and %T =1=e where d is the maximum vertex degree
and e is the number of edges of the graph.
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Using this construction we can give a key predistribution scheme for a family
(Pi;Fi)i=1; :::; ‘ with Pi ⊂ U and Fi ⊂ 2U where F ∩ Pi = ∅ for any F ∈Fi and
i = 1; : : : ; ‘. In this key predistribution scheme every privileged subset contains Pi
and the family of forbidden subsets is Fi. The way to de/ne this key predistribution
scheme is the following: let us suppose that F=
⋃‘
i=1Fi is F={F1; : : : ; Ft} and de/ne
G={G1; : : : ; Gt} with Gi=U−Fi for i=1; : : : ; t. Let  :G∪{D1; : : : ; D‘} → GF(q)t be
a map de/ned by  (Gi)= ei with e1; : : : ; et the canonical basis of GF(q)t and  (Di)=∑
Fj∈Fi ej. In this case the access structure de/ned in G is i = cl({G: U−G ∈Fi}).
The dual access structure is ∗i = cl({{G}: U− G ∈Fi}). Propositions 1 and 2 give
us the following result:
Corollary 4. For a given family of subsets (Pi;Fi) with Pi ⊂ U for any i = 1; : : : ; ‘
and Fi ⊂ 2U with F ∩Pi=∅ for any F ∈Fi, there is a key predistribution scheme in
the set of users U where users in Pi are privileged users and the family of forbidden
subsets is Fi.
This key predistribution scheme takes at random s1; : : : ; st ∈GF(q) and gives every
si to users in U− Fi. Secret ki is de/ned by ki =
∑
Fj∈Fi sj. In this case every vector
space secret sharing scheme can be thought of as a Karnin et al. secret sharing scheme
[10] for the set of participants {G: U− G ∈Fi} ⊂ G.
The constructed key predistribution scheme is optimal with respect to both the keys
held by each user and the keys generated by the trusted authority [3].
If Pi and Fi verify that U = Pi ∪ (
⋃
F∈Fi F), then in this construction the only
privileged users are users in Pi and forbidden subsets Fi.
A particular case of this construction is the Fiat–Naor key predistribution scheme [7],
taken any Pi ⊂ U, i=1; : : : ; ‘ with ‘=2|U| andFi={F ⊂ U: |F |6!; F∩Pi=∅} ⊂ 2U,
with !¿ 1.
4. Some extensions of the construction
Some extensions of this construction can be carried out. The /rst is to use a linear
secret sharing scheme, that is, considering that every subset G ∈G can have more
than one vector. Section 3 results hold for this construction with few modi/cations in
Proposition 3.
The majority of key predistribution schemes de/ned so far have been de/ned in the
following way. For a collection of random numbers (s1; : : : ; st) pieces of information for
every user are constructed as linear combinations of numbers (s1; : : : ; st). The common
secret key of a subset of privileged users is a linear combination of (s1; : : : ; st). All the
key predistribution schemes de/ned in Section 3 are of this kind.
Proposition 5. Let a key predistribution scheme be one in which pieces of informa-
tion owned by users and secret keys of privileged subsets are linear combinations of
random numbers. Then, this key predistribution scheme uses a family of linear secret
sharing schemes, that is, it is one of those de=ned in Section 4.
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Proof. Let us suppose that the r diNerent pieces of information owned by users in U
are tj=
∑t
i=1 aijsi, j=1; : : : ; r, for the random numbers (s1; : : : ; st). Let be kPj=
∑t
i=1 dijsi
the secret key associated with privileged set Pj for j = 1; : : : ; ‘. De/ne
Gj = {u∈U: u has tj as a private piece of information}
for j = 1; : : : ; r. Suppose that they are diNerent and let G be the collection of all of
them. Then, the key predistribution scheme given is the same as that constructed using
 :G ∪ {D1; : : : ; D‘} → GF(q)t with  (Gj) = (a1j; : : : ; atj) and  (Dj) = (d1j; : : : ; dtj).
If we have for some i; j that Gi = Gj then  (Gj) is de/ned by all the correspondent
vectors, that is  (Gj) = {(a1m; : : : ; atm): Gm = Gj}.
Let us present an example of a key predistribution scheme in which pieces of infor-
mation and secret keys are linear combinations of random numbers. Let U= {1; 2; 3}
be a set of users and for random elements r1; : : : ; r6 ∈GF(q) we have the secret keys
k1 = r1 + r4, k2 = r5 and k3 = r3 + r6. Suppose that user 1 has r1; r2; r4; r5 − r2, user 2
has r1; r3; r4; r6, and user 3 has r2; r3; r4; r5− r2. The piece of information r1 determines
G1 = {1; 2}, piece of information r2 determines G2 = {1; 3}, piece of information r3
determines G3 = {2; 3}, piece of information r4 determines G4 = {1; 2; 3}, piece of
information r5 − r2 determines the same G2 and piece of information r6 determines
G5 = {2}. So, the key predistribution scheme given is the same as that constructed
using  :G ∪ {D1; D2; D3} → GF(q)6 with G= {G1; : : : ; G5} and
x  (x)
G1 (1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0)
G2 (0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0); (0;−1; 0; 0; 1; 0)
G3 (0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0)
G4 (0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0)
G5 (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1)
D1 (1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0)
D2 (0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0)
D3 (0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1)
Proposition 5 together with Propositions 1 and 2 give us a method to compute the
subsets of privileged users and families of forbidden subsets to any key predistribu-
tion scheme in which secrets and pieces of secrets are linear combinations of random
numbers.
As a particular case of our construction we can recover the majority of key pre-
distribution schemes. For instance, the trivial scheme is a (P;FP)P-key predistribu-
tion scheme for P ⊂ U with |P| = t and FP = {F ⊂ U: P ∩ F = ∅}. Suppose that
G={P ⊂ U: |P|= t} is G={P1; : : : ; P‘}. This key predistribution scheme is de/ned by
 :G∪{D1; : : : ; D‘} → GF(q)‘ such that  (Pi)= (Di)=ei with e1; : : : ; e‘ the canonical
basis of GF(q)‘. Then the de/ned access structures are i=∗i =cl({{Pi}}). Fiat–Naor
predistribution scheme was generated in Section 3 as an application of Corollary 4.
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It can be shown that Blom’s scheme is a particular case of our construction using a
linear secret sharing scheme in which ij = cl({{i}; {j}}∪{A ⊂ G: |A|=!+1}) with
G={{u}: u∈U}. A similar result can be found for Blundo et al. and Matsumoto–Imai
key predistribution schemes.
For the most important key predistribution schemes, secret keys are generated using
some algorithms, in such a way that the value is found at the end of the algorithm. For
our construction, the question of when given secrets can be predistributed is discussed.
Suppose that our key predistribution scheme is constructed using  :G∪{D1; : : : ; D‘} →
GF(q)t . If we want to distribute secrets k1; : : : ; k‘, we should take at random a vector
v∈GF(q)t such that
k1 =  (D1) v;
...
k‘ =  (D‘) v:
Then, the predistribution of given secrets can only be possible when this linear system
of equations has a solution.
Finally, we can use a family of secret sharing schemes which, through an initial
issuing of shares, permit a number of diNerent secrets to be protected. This more
general framework is called a multisecret sharing scheme (see [9] for more details).
For such a kind of secret sharing scheme the results of Section 3 hold with few
modi/cations in Proposition 3.
5. Conclusions
A new construction of key predistribution schemes is considered in this paper. This
construction is based on the use of a family of vector space secret sharing schemes.
We determine the subset of privileged users for a secret key by means of the access
structure of the used secret sharing scheme. We also /nd the family of forbidden subsets
in terms of the dual of the vector space access structure. We obtain the information
rate and the total information rate of the proposed scheme. As a particular case of this
construction we show a key predistribution scheme for a given collection of privileged
subsets together with its family of forbidden subsets. Besides, we present an extension
of this construction by means of linear secret sharing schemes instead of vector space
secret sharing schemes. We /nd that any key predistribution scheme in which pieces of
information and secrets are linear combinations of random numbers is a particular case
of this construction. Using the results above, we show a method to compute the subsets
of privileged users and families of forbidden subsets. This method applies for any key
predistribution scheme in which secrets and pieces of secrets are linear combinations
of random numbers. We show, explicitly, that the most important key predistribution
schemes can be seen as particular cases of this construction. We discuss when given
secrets can be predistributed. The paper ends by showing that the fact that all the
results hold when a multisecret sharing scheme is used instead of vector space secret
sharing schemes or linear secret sharing schemes.
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